By Yasmin Abbasoy
April
The results of the Turkish local elections, which took place on March 31, were, for most observers, anything but predictable. In a final count that left the opposition buoyed by a rare taste of success and the government facing an unexpected defeat, re-elected Istanbul mayor Ekrem Imamığlu seemed to have captured the unified feeling of a nation when he remarked that “The rules of Turkish politics are being re-written.”
Turkey was all but overtaken by what has been called a “red wave.” While the customary red of the main opposition party colors the west of the election map, as usual, what is surprising though is the slow creep eastward towards historical government party AKP strongholds in central Anatolia. The opposition CHP took a total of 10 mayorships from the AKP, for a final split of 35 cities being governed by the opposition while the government won 24. Behind the numbers, however, is a startling shift in the balance of politics Having received 37.7 percent of the vote, the CHP will now govern 48.8 percent of Turkey’s population, with the rest split between the three relevant opposition parties. It has taken control of almost all industrial and cultural centers in the country.
This massive rebalancing of power has set off much speculation: are voters finally sick of Erdoğan, entering his twenty-second year in some form of power? Or is this a warning rather than a complete withdrawal of support? Almost all of the provinces that voted for the AKP in March had overwhelmingly elected Erdoğan in the general elections last year, granting him his second presidential term. Are economic factors the cause of a mass disengagement from the ruling party, or are there other reasons at play?
Another shift in the political paradigm took place in Istanbul, where incumbent CHP favorite Imamoğlu took a comfortable victory, despite much hand wringing about the changing preferences of Kurdish voters. In his victory speech, he highlighted the fact that he had won not just against government-supported candidate Murat Kurum, but also the president and all of his ministers. Istanbul has long been considered the battleground of Turkey's future, with President Erdoğan himself linking his blooming political career to his early success as the mayor of the city. It has been a site of a shrewd powerplay throughout the election cycle, with Erdoğan throwing his and his government's support very visibly behind Kurum. This perceived victory over the President himself bodes well for Imamoğlu’s future. Since the 2019 elections, he has been the ideal unity presidential candidate of the opposition. Having lost his chance last year to outgoing party chairman Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, this victory guarantees his place on the ballot in the upcoming 2029 elections.
Kurdish voters, who undeniably carried Imamoğlu to victory in Istanbul, defied expectations by voting for Imamoğlu in droves. An enthusiastic campaign by pro-Kurdish DEM Party leaders in the city amounted to a meager two percent of votes, with Imamoğlu retaining and even increasing the gap with his rival. Despite the disintegration of the formal opposition alliance, voters seem to have stuck together behind Imamoğlu–a saving grace for a party long concerned with balancing the Kurdish and home nationalist vote.
When it comes to the AKP, the big question is “Why?” All indicators, as well as several statements from party insiders, seemed to indicate that Erdoğan was expecting a comfortable victory, even in Istanbul. When even the most preliminary results were not in the AKP’s favor, Erdoğan canceled his planned victory speech in Istanbul and set off towards Ankara. There, he gave a delayed speech after midnight, in which he acknowledged his defeat and promised to reflect and earn the peoples’ favor once more. A big topic of discussion regarding the somewhat nonsensical AKP failure has been Turkish policy toward Israel considering the war in Gaza. In the weeks leading up to the election, well-known journalist Metin Cihan caused massive backlash against the government policy vis-a-vis Israel by unearthing documents showing the trade of government-owned firms with Israel, despite strong condemnations of the state’s actions in Gaza by the government. In parallel, the election cycle had seen the AKP forge closer ties with the Welfare Once Again Party, which in the later stages heavily criticized the government on this point from its Islamist stance. The message seemed to resonate, as the realistically minor party managed to walk away with two cities taken from the AKP at the end of election, which perhaps served as a beacon for those who felt betrayed by the president's hypocrisy.
Other minor parties also suffered–nationalist IYI Party leader Meral Akşener was widely considered to have dug her own grave when she walked out of the opposition alliance over disagreements on the candidate in 2023. Her party, made up of ex-government coalition voters, has always had a strong strain of anti-government feeling which fueled its alliance with the opposition. After a disappointing performance in general elections, where the party failed to attract pro-government voters, as was their primary purpose, the party had been in a state of limbo. Election results reflected this, as the party, which used to be the 4th largest in Turkey, won a singular province in central Anatolia and a humiliating 3.77 percent of the vote. Upon learning of the results, Akşener announced her resignation among a wave of the same.
The post election landscape has been predictably rocky as the government scrambles to hold onto power where it still can. In southeastern Van, won by Abdullah Zeydan of the pro-Kurdish DEM Party, the government wasted no time issuing a decree to remove the mandate of the mayor-elect. This is a part of a larger pattern of mayoral removals in the Kurdish southeast of the country. While all candidates are pre-approved by the Supreme Electoral Board prior to being granted permission to run, the government post facto accused Zeydan of ties to the PKK, which Turkey considers a terrorist organization, and thus granted the mayorship to the runner-up AKP candidate. Zeydan, who had served a prison sentence for attending the funerals of PKK members, drew support from the local population as well as statements from major political figures. After a tense few days of protest and brutal suppression by the Turkish state, Zeydan was surprisingly reinstated to his post by the Supreme Electoral Board.
The elections marked a significant shift in the political paradigm of the Turkish state. The surprising victory of the opposition reflects a growing discontentment with the ruling AKP, raising questions about the future trajectory of Turkish politics. As parties strategize for the looming 2029 presidential race, the stage is set for a period of realignment in the political sphere. Only time will tell if it garners results.