By Yasmin Abbasoy
February
In its newly-published 2023 end-of-year results, Boeing has for the first time foregone its traditional section on “financial and operational objectives” in order to emphasize its newfound commitment to safety. The leading aerospace company has been witness to more scrutiny than it could have ever conceived, primarily due to its flagship 737 MAX 9 carrier which has recently resulted in various catastrophes. These recent events have brought to light the company’s various errors regarding its work culture and practices.
When a door plug, a mechanism that replaces an extra built-in emergency door in the middle of the MAX-9, detached from the Alaska Airlines flight 1282 merely 6 minutes into the flight, it would come to be seen as nothing more than the natural consequence of decisions taken at the company. The plane, scheduled for a domestic flight on Jan. 5, was in the world of commercial flight, brand new. It had been in service for approximately 2 months, having under its wing close to 500 flight hours. A malfunction stemming from age was unlikely on such an aircraft, and the plane had had no problems during routine maintenance.Thankfully, there was no loss of life–oxygen masks descended as the vacant space left by the plug uncontrollably depressurized the airplane. By a stroke of luck, the seat next to the plug was empty. The spontaneous suction did, however, pull a shirt off a teenage boy and scatter personal belongings across the flight path–including an Iphone which was found functioning and still in flight mode two days later.
The MAX-9 fleet which comprised 65 planes was immediately subjected to an Emergency Airworthiness Directive by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). The regulatory body issued this directive to confirm the recognition of improper conditions that required immediate action on the part of the manufacturer. An ongoing investigation was launched as Boeing developed a new inspection process to be approved by the FAA, after which the planes were cleared for flight at the end of January.
The Alaska Airlines debacle is not the first worrying complication seen in a Boeing-manufactured aircraft. It was not even the first complication for its own series–the MAX-8, predecessor to the MAX-9, had in March of 2019 been grounded for 20 months after two deadly crashes which killed 349 people in total. There had been some adjustments to the positioning of the engine on this model, one which would cause divergences in the behavior of the plane that had to be accounted for. Boeing installed a new software, which was found in the ensuing investigation to be inaccurate and difficult to use or override. Industry insiders found the two accidents “eerily similar,” and worried about a brand-new plane failing twice in the space of a year.
The grounding of the MAX-8 was a dramatic measure–the firm is vitally important to the U.S. economy, being a leading exporter with a global network of over 20.000 suppliers. Boeing is estimated to have lost at least $20 billion in direct costs as a result. A mishandling of the aftermath saw CEO Dennis Muilenburg sacked for his over-optimistic forecasts of the process of getting the grounded planes back in the air and his blundering of congressional hearings. Congressional investigators found that the company culture was to blame, with employees encouraged to push the airplane out into the market ahead of rival, Airbus, at the expense of quality control. Messages exchanged among employees provided for the investigation revealed a startling lack of confidence in the product–the development process of the MAX-8 was commented on with wry detachment, with the core development team being referred to as “clowns.”
The culture problem at Boeing is, as of 2020, congressionally acknowledged, and Boeing’s latest news update on its website shows a clear plan for increased scrutiny and reprioritized safety, with the expected corporate public relations tint. The problem itself, however, may have been decades in the making. Industry experts tie the shift in culture to a 1997 merger between Boeing and the defense contractor McDonnell Douglas. Well-known for their military planes, the company was acquired for about $14 billion. While it was the Boeing name that stayed on, a dramatic shift was gradually occurring internally. Journalist Peter Robison posits that a pre-merger Boeing was a company of engineers, focused solely on quality production and client satisfaction. McDonnell Douglas, on the other hand, put more value on delivering products and pleasing shareholders, as efficiently as possible. Illustratively, after the merger, Boeing headquarters was moved from Seattle, the heart of production for the firm, to Chicago.
The emphasis on quantity over quality has led to a reliance on subcontracting: the 737-MAX supply chain has over 600 suppliers, which too have felt the pressure. Ed Pierson, a former manager at one of Boeing’s 737 factories, describes a “pressure to push planes out of the door” and a culture of retaliation against employees who call attention to the lack of quality standards. Upon investigation precipitated by the Alaska Airline incident, Delta and United Airlines found that the bolts designed to secure the door plug on their MAX-9 aircraft were not properly tightened. This ring of the production chain is handled by Spirit Aerosystem, a subcontractor, in their Malaysia factory. The preliminary report released from the investigative committee found that the four bolts on Alaska Airlines flight 1282 were completely missing. That is, the plane had flown 500 hours without them.
The increased attention on its manufacturing process has not boded well for Boeing. Though CEO Dave Calhoun, brought in after Muilenburg, has acknowledged a “quality escape,” and the media is all too willing to pounce on any instance of a faulty Boeing product. One such instance was when U.S. Secretary of State, Antony Blinken’s 737 plane had to be switched on the way back from the World Economic Forum in Davos due to a “critical failure.”
An employee has also recently shared images with the media of a Boeing facility in which hangs the sign–and presumably, the company motto–”Just Ship It.” Understandably, the newest topic in the news cycle has been the continued discovery of misdrilled holes in the fuselage of Boeing 737 planes. As the systemic nature of the Boeing Problem is pushed further and further into the spotlight, it is Boeing that must adjust and recalibrate, or come crashing down.