December Issue
By Jad Toufic Toutinji
March
On March 1, Iranian voters went to polling stations as elections for the Islamic Consultative Assembly (ICA) and the Assembly of Experts (AoE) were due. In reality, with a record-low turnout rate of 41 percent, it can safely be said that barely any voters took part in the election because of several years of economic instability and violent anti-regime protests, such as the 2022 nation-wide protests following Mahsa Amini’s tragic murder. Indeed, boycotting the elections was, for many, especially in the diaspora, the only realistic form of resistance. The victory of the current regime, which was unsurprising for everyone, holds several messages. However, its validity and democratic facade must be taken with a pinch of salt.
Results
In both the ICA and the Assembly of Experts, the elections consolidated the regime’s grip of power in a typical political scenery which has remained unchanged since the Islamic Revolution in 1979. It came without a surprise when taking into consideration the electorate’s apathy and the high number of disqualifications by the Guardian Council of opposition candidates based on a perceived threat to the regime and the nation.
In the ICA, the regime won 138 seats while 48 independents and 25 reformists only won on the opposing side. Moreover, only 11 women managed to get a seat in the ICA. As for the 88 members of the AoE, 53 of those elected were already incumbents, reflecting the little change that took place. Even for the new elected members, a majority of them are young members who also align with the regime and Khamenei. Indeed, the regime’s power remains unchallenged within the assemblies.
“The Iranian people know well these elections are unrepresentative, whatever the outcome. And we do too,” expressed U.S. Deputy Special Envoy for Iran Abram Paley on X after seeing the results. Many critics of the regime refused to recognize the elections’ results and believe that the supposed Iranian democracy is a means through which the Iranian regime legitimizes itself.
Moreover, the criticism began even before the elections took place. With the record-low turnout rate, the Iranian regime had to call its people several times to cast their votes. Not only so, but even the participation rate of some provinces, like Tehran, have yet to be declared (at the current time of writing). This low turnout reflects the electorate’s apathy, the collective boycott, and the lack of alternative options.
The opposition voters and the anti-regime protesters feel hopeless of any change coming as a result of an election orchestrated by the regime apparatus. Many who did not go, despite being in economic instability and critical of the ruling clerics, perceive that the time to vote can be traded off for providing living sustenance, especially that voting will not change anything in the embedded totalitarian power. Meanwhile the economic trade-off was rational for the impoverished, hopeless Iranian citizens, it was also logical for them to boycott the orchestrated elections in order to delegitimize the results which were inevitably not going to sway in their favour. Choosing not to vote was and has always been the Iranian citizen’s political statement of opposition to an oppressive theocratic rule.
In addition, many oppositions and reformists called to boycott the election, or at least displayed their refusal to participate, some of whom were part of the regime such as former regime president Mohamad Khatami. Khatami’s refusal to cast a vote in the name of standing with the discontented Iranian people has sparked major debates in the country. Loyalist clerics have inevitably criticized his move, while other opposition members see that it is a maneuver to position himself as a leader for the unrepresented people as well as the reformist, to whom he belongs. The opposition criticizes him for remaining a reformist, having not declared the end of his allegiance to the Islamist ideology and religious democracy of the system.
Furthermore, even the opposing and reformist voters who still believe in the potentiality of change through elections did not have candidates to vote for. In the AoE, after the Guardian Council had disqualified 366 out of 510 candidates, only 144 candidates were competing for 88 seats. In other words, some seats did not have two competing candidates, thus limiting the voters to either the regime’s candidate or a blank vote, the latter which the regime disregards as trivial.
What After?
Despite the unchallenged victory of the regime, the low turnout sent a clear message: a strong majority of the people, given the chance to, will unequivocally express their resistance and dissatisfaction to the ruling regime. Thus, in the upcoming years, the Islamic Republic will have to work on further consolidating their power internally to avoid any repercussions that would threaten its regional influence and internal grip.
At the age of 84-years-old, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is set to be succeeded should he die or fall incapable of maintaining his duties. Accordingly, the recently elected AoE, which is responsible to elect the supreme leader’s successor, might have to deal with this challenge in the upcoming eight years. In this context, the massive number of candidate disqualifications that took place should be seen as only an attempt by the regime to suppress opposition to the rule. It should also be perceived as Khamenei’s attempt to secure his own choice of his successor, which looks likely to be his son Mojtaba Khamenei even if no public designation has been made in fear of the successor’s assassination.
Former president Hassan Rouhani, as well as other notable ministers like Ali Fallahian and Mohamad Alavi appeared on the list of disqualified candidates. Hassan Rouhani, having not been a strong hardliner to the regime and having been elected by the people, was seen as a potential candidate should a shift in power take place between hardliners and reformists. As to the ministers, both of whom served as intelligence ministers, it was a tactful move to avoid an internal revolt by the intelligence and the military after Khamenei’s death. Indeed, little by little, Khamenei is assuring that his son, or the candidate of his choice like current president Ebrahim Raisi, will succeed him as smoothly as possible.
In spite of all inter-regime politics, the regime still has the task to mitigate the public outrage if it wishes to lengthen its survival, especially post-Khamenei. If Mojtaba, or any other candidate, reaches power with a strong public dissent to the regime, then it is likely that further economic collapse, as well as the weakening of aid to allied militant groups, like the Houthis and Hezbollah, will be seen. Moreso, in this context of impoverished legitimacy of the cleric and an undecided successor, is it possible that military and intelligence leaders seize power in the case of Khameini’s death to ensure the survival of the regime? Could the Iranian Supreme Leader become only a symbolic face to a military-intelligence hegemony?