Constructing a Technocratic Government in Post-War Gaza

Amidst debates on democracies and their discontents, technocracies often appear as a viable alternative model of governance. In the West Bank and Gaza, where de facto democracy has long been out of the question and the destructive implications of war continue to devastate, a technocracy may be the only viable solution to address the needs of a population in ruins.

The Palestinian Authority (PA), which was inaugurated following the Oslo Peace Process between the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Israeli government, governs the West Bank under the banner of Fatah, a faction of the PLO. Born from the Gaza-Jericho Agreement, which promised the Palestinian populations residing in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip the future creation of an independent Palestinian state, the Palestinian Authority has lost any trace of domestic democratic legitimacy over the years. Following Hamas’ victory in the 2006 general elections and subsequent conflicts with Fatah, Gaza has been under the rule of the militant-terrorist group Hamas. This has led to the fragmented political system that is found today, where the two territories are under the control of two rival political groups. For many Palestinians, this fracture has been among the most harmful obstacles to the Palestinian cause, leading to disunity in the movement for nation-building. 

The potential for democratic rule in the PA, although promising at the start, has diminished tremendously over the years. The cancellation of the presidential and legislative elections in 2021 by the President of the PA, Mahmoud Abbas, is a recent example of the stymied space for political plurality. His four-year term was meant to have ended in 2009. Yet, with his rule by decree, strict control over the judicial system, dissolution of the legislative council and purging of rivals, he continues to dominate the PA and the PLO. To make matters worse, the opposition candidate for the 2021 elections, Nizar Banat, is said to have died in police custody, sparking popular outrage from within the Palestinian population. In general, the PA is viewed by many Palestinians with suspicion; according to a study by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR), more than half of the Palestinians surveyed in June 2023 were in favor of the dissolution of the PA. The proliferation of illegal Israeli settlements in Area C of the West Bank, alongside PA cooperation with the Israeli Defense Forces to repress internal Palestinian opposition, have been the final nail in the coffin for the PA’s popular legitimacy. With the Israeli government’s increasing control over the administration and civil affairs in Areas A and B as well, the PA has come to be perceived as complicit in Israel’s actions. In the eyes of many, it is no longer a real autonomous authority capable of governance. It is also dependent on international and Israeli funding, leading critics to wonder whether it can ever truly take a resolute stance against these foreign actors. Especially after the chaos that superseded Oct. 7, the PA has proven one thing: it is unable to effectively deal with Hamas and ease the plight of Palestinians.

In the name of political survival, the PA has not remained as the one true representative of the Palestinian general public. 

The West Bank’s fragile democracy thus suffers from a double blow on legitimacy: it is ruled by an authority that is deemed ‘authoritarian’ by the Freedom House and is under Israeli occupation in certain territories. However, calls for a reform, emerging from both internal and external actors, seem to have resurfaced now with the resignation of the Prime Minister Mohammad Shtayyeh and his cabinet. This arrives at a time of “international orientation supporting the establishment of a single Palestinian Authority over all of the Palestinian territories,” according to Minister of Social Affairs, Ahmed Majdalaini. The United States’ vocal approval of such efforts to “reform and revitalize” evinces this, having long been preceded by pressures for political unity and the restructuring of the PA. It is still unclear whether the resignation is a move to preserve the existing structures rather than revitalize the system itself, but if the proposal for technocracy is truly meaningful, then the necessary reconstruction of the Palestinian Authority may follow through.

Amidst the uncertainty of the current state of the Hamas-Israel war, envisioning reconstruction in Gaza under a technocratic government offers a glimmer of hope to the disillusioned populations of the Palestinian territories. The technocratic government would not only end the political and territorial split of the PA but could also overcome the problems of ‘corruption, nepotism and inefficiency’, in the words of former PA official Ghaith al-Omari, that it has been associated with over the past few years. Although sources offer varying visions of what the technocratic government would look like, or how long it would last for, the basic consensus is that the negotiation process would represent different factions and different regional players, including Egypt. It would operate outside the realm of politics and would be governed by nonpartisan experts until the time is right for elections. 

A popular example of a technocratic government in recent years was found in Italy, where the Prime Minister post was taken up by economist Mario Monti. His 13-month government has been applauded for plunging Italy out of a crisis of credibility through its decisive structural reforms. Technocracies have been deemed in a positive light in parliamentary democracies, especially when appointed for a limited time horizon to respond to emergencies. Despite lacking the legitimacy that comes with a democratic vote, these governments have proven to be successful in getting things done. Particularly in a place as embedded in failed governance as Gaza, the chance of depoliticizing administration and establishing a government that is not inherently attached to the complex politics of the region must be grabbed. More importantly, the civil and social rights of the residents of Gaza, which have been persistently violated, can finally be protected. Foreign minister Al-Maliki articulates the goals and needs of the Palestinian people in the following words, “We want to be accepted and engaging fully with the international community. We want to get contribution[s] that help in order for us to be able to provide first of all the necessary services to our people, emergency services, then to talk about how we can reconstruct Gaza after such devastating destruction." The technocratic government can re-establish international ties to bring these to life. 

The endorsement of the United States, Saudi Arabia and other Arab states for this technocratic government, however, does raise questions about sovereignty and the role of these foreign powers in its establishment. Moreover, it is uncertain whether Israel will be equally willing to relinquish control over Gaza at the end of the war; the Knesset recently voted against “unilateral” recognition of a Palestinian state. The very survival of the PA appears to be precarious. But it is worth noting that the talk of the formation of this technocratic government can itself be construed as part of a larger strategy of reaching a ceasefire. Politically uniting the leadership of Palestinians also brings them closer to the prospect of a Palestinian state in the years to come. It is undeniable that the stakes are high for the future politics of Gaza. The viability of a technocratic state can also be questioned. Nevertheless, it is now evident that the international community is prepared to conceive of scenarios for a long-term resolution.

A plethora of points for contemplation arise from this new proposal, starting with: to what extent will the international community be involved in post-resolution Gaza? Will a true democracy follow the technocratic government? Or will it follow the precedent of Mahmoud Abbas’s 19-year presidency? Could collaboration in reconstruction efforts mitigate tensions between Arab states and the United States? Can stability ever exist in Gaza? A statement by the Chinese premier Zhou en-Lai, made when responding to what he thinks of the French Revolution of 1789, is equally valid as an answer to these questions: “It is too early to tell.”