Armenia: The EU As a Destination?

Ever since the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia has understood that it is surrounded by dangerous neighbors. Notably, Armenia’s unreliable ally, Russia, does not even consider Armenia’s interests as a secondary priority. Since the defeat and the rise of a new geopolitical opportunity through the Russia-Ukraine war, Armenia has seriously taken into consideration to join the European Union (EU), and the EU has cleared their way to apply. Thus, the Western bloc, especially after Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan announced the freezing of its Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) membership. In March, the Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan said that applying for an EU membership is “being discussed.” Later, the European Parliament passed a resolution confirming that Armenia can apply for membership as it meets the requirements of the Maastricht Treaty Article 49. 

What are the motives for both sides? What about Russia? 

Armenia’s motives to join the EU are mostly defensive. Located in the Caucuses and surrounded by threats from all its neighbors (apart from Georgia), it makes absolute sense that it seeks to ensure its security. With Russia occupying Ukraine and having proven untrustworthy and unreliable in the war against Azerbaijan, France, arguably the leader of the EU, has strongly been a resort for arms sales and strengthening the military. For example, in October 2023, Paris declared it would sell an air defense system to Armenia and provide other military and humanitarian aid. Thus, in a time when Armenia feels dangerously besieged, the EU appears as an inevitable option. 

On the other side of the story, the EU would benefit strategically from swaying Armenia to its side. First and foremost, a foothold in Armenia presents an opportunity for military pressure on Türkiye but also, obviously, Russia. Moreover, in the long run, leverage in Armenia can, should any geopolitical shifts take place, provide access to energy resources through Azerbaijan and potentially avoid Turkish and Russian hegemony over it. Not only so, but seeing the widespread Armenian diaspora, especially in the Middle East, the EU would also gain several political influences in the region, for instance, in Türkiye and Lebanon.

Nevertheless, a shortcoming that the EU might discover later is that expanding into Armenia could translate into a consistent risk of immigrant influx from Central Asia, the Caucasus, Russia and the Middle East region. Inevitably, too, the geopolitical benefits will translate into further tensions with Iran, Türkiye and Russia as these countries begin to feel surrounded. The EU may have to interfere politically and potentially militarily on several occasions if the aforementioned countries decide to act upon or create political traps for the EU countries. 

As to Russia, apart from the political and security messages, Armenia joining the EU will be seen as an intrusion in a region historically dominated by it, which puts Putin’s narrative of an alternative to the West under doubt. 

But, Armenia is not in continental Europe. 

The precedent for a non-European geographic country being in the EU exists if we consider Cyprus as being part of Asia or looking at the non-European territories of France and other European countries too. Not to forget, joining the EU is more reliant on upholding the values assigned in the Maastricht Treaty and the Copenhagen Criteria, which do not give reference to geographic location. Moreso, Armenia has already politically engaged with Europe through participation in bodies like the Council of Europe. 

Is it as easy as it sounds?

It would be naïve to assume that Armenia joining will take place in a matter of months. Firstly, EU accessions are known to take years, often decades, to be fully completed. By the time a full accession takes place, if it ever does, the geopolitics of the region and the role of Russia might have shifted significantly.

Apart from the natural time constraints, there are still over 10,000 Russian troops in Armenia. In April, however, Yerevan sent an official request to Moscow to remove its troops from Zvartnots International Airport, as Armen Grigorian, Armenian Security Council Secretary has said. The Kremlin (at the time of writing) denies receiving an official request, explaining why it has not started any withdrawals. Nonetheless, it is doubtful that Moscow would commit to withdrawal as it would lead to Russian loss of influence. In the past, Russia has pressured the continuity of Russian troops on ex-USSR territory, whether forcible or willingly, such as in Georgia and Crimea; hence, it would not be surprising if Russia decides to infringe upon Armenian sovereignty to protect its regional hegemony. In the future, it would be expected to see that this infringement will keep on increasing the closer Yerevan becomes to Brussels. The real question would be to see whether Russia might be further pressured by Armenian rapprochement to the EU that it intervenes militarily or leads a coup d’état. 

Another difficulty is geography: are small European states willing to deal with the threats surrounding Armenia, especially at a time of the rise of the European right? In light of the recent rapprochement between Hungary’s Orban and Türkiye’s Erdogan, will a hampering of the process of accession also take place by Türkiye via Orban? Lastly, Armenia is geographically isolated from most trade with the EU, so it remains to be seen whether or not further economic integration plans will be proposed and are feasible even; in another sense, will the driver for accession remain only for security purposes for Armenia? In a decade’s time, if no economic integration proposals take place, the incentive to join the West might change, thus slowing or even ending the attempt.