December Issue
By Catarina Vita for Sciences Defense
March
The population of Somalia, located in the Horn of Africa, has been subject to a variety of threats, ranging from pirates swarming its coast to colonization and neocolonialism. The terrorist group prevalent in the country, Al-Shabaab, has also threatened the already feeble government of the country, and this still has not changed. After undergoing the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), the mission’s aim to decrease Al-Shabaab’s presence over the territory was implemented, but costly in deaths and instability. Nonetheless, AMISOM aimed to build a Somali National Army, in addition to a stabilized police force and government, and these goals, according to the African Union, were achieved. As the AMISOM was due to end in December 2021, the ATMIS, the African Transition Mission in Somalia, was implemented in April 2022, focusing on implementing the Somali Transition Plan that began under AMISOM. This transition plan, according to ATMIS, is divided into four axes: the reconfiguration of the government, yielding Forward Operating Bases (or simply military bases) to the Somali government progressively, and finally dissolving the ATMIS. The yielding of the Forward Operating Bases, due to its ideal progressive character, consists of two axes. The transition period was reinforced after a delayed election in May 2022.
President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud was re-elected after already being in power from 2012 to 2017. The delays had a variety of justifications from region to region, but they were widely attributed to technical delays and the country's instability caused by Al-Shabaab. The President vowed to restore Somali stability, threatened primarily by Al-Shabaab. ATMIS forces are bound to leave Somalia by December 2024. “Somalia has one year to expel (...) Al-Shabaab,” said the President according to Reuters in late November 2023.
President Mohamud's Plan
Parallel to ATMIS’ efforts, President Mohamud launched military efforts against Al-Shabaab in August 2022, specifically surrounding the territory the terrorist group controlled. Thus far, the military operation is divided into two stages, one announced in August 2022 and another in March of the subsequent year. During the first stage, the government allied with the Hawyie clan in Somalia and was able to relinquish 215 Somali areas that were previously controlled by Al-Shabaab, mostly in the central region. According to a study by the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, the Hawyie clan was primordial to the operation, given that they participated in 155 events against Al-Shabaab and supported the government in 60 percent of their events relative to the relinquishing of Al-Shabaab territory.
The second stage of the military operation focuses on the southernmost parts of Somalia, where the government anticipates lowered clan support due to the secessionist movement of Jubaland. The study also reveals increasing reliance on neighboring countries’ armies, such as Djibouti and Ethiopia, in which 30,000 soldiers were promised to be dedicated to anti-Al-Shabaab efforts.
Announced in March 2023 and planned to take action in mid-2023, the Somali-led military operation was confronted with significant setbacks. Due to attacks in central Somalia by Al-Shabaab that led to the recapturing of some areas by the terrorist group, the operation could no longer focus on the southern region as originally planned. In Hirshabelle, one of the central Somali regions that Al-Shabaab recaptured, ATMIS forces joined the efforts of the Somali national army in June 2023, prior to the retraction of 20,000 ATMIS troops. This retraction is compliant with the four axes that guide this transition mission. In August 2023, as the second stage of the operation officially began, Al-Shabaab attacked the central village of Cowsweyne. Due to the substantial deaths of Somali soldiers, the Somali national army retreated. According to VOA Somalia, the Somali national forces recognized that they faltered in “not securing supply routes to the troops.” Brigadier General Abdirahman Turaye affirmed a change in the military approach to the operation. Instead of dependence on Somali national army forces and also considering the gradual retreat of ATMIS soldiers, local citizens are offered the opportunity to fight against Al-Shabaab for financial compensation. The presence of citizens in the battlespace, as aforementioned with the clan presence in August 2022, contributed to the successful launch of the military operation. Nonetheless, it is unknown if Al-Shabaab’s presence in relinquished land resulted from a change in their land-seizing methods. Currently, the military operation in Somalia is stalled.
Through the Lens of Security: Analyzing the Operation’s Success
The military operation in Somalia against Al-Shabaab held surprisingly positive fruits for the government at its beginning stages. The president’s ambitious plan to completely abolish the terrorist group’s presence in the country seemed realistic in early stages. When analyzing the Somali approach to counterterrorism, it is important to recognize the historical and socio-political context of the country. Prior to AMISOM, they barely possessed an official army, let alone stable and knowledgeable intelligence agencies. To have been able to mobilize a national army and direct it towards one issue exceeded global expectations and could provoke, somewhat, hope for transitional governments around the world.
Expecting a country like Somalia, a victim of colonialism, neocolonialism and governmental instability, to use intelligence and strategy to approach its counterterrorism issues is beyond unfair. However, the Somali approach against Al-Shabaab can be considered rather shallow, regarding the amount of time the terrorist group spent possessing Somali territory and the amount of instability it caused. The national army could win Al-Shabaab by force, and clan support was crucial since they were also affected by Al-Shabaab’s actions, giving them a reason to support the army's efforts. However, little thought was given to the strategy of maintaining the regained territory under the government’s rule. Installing permanent army officers could have been a successful option if not considering the limited number of people in the Somali national army. In terms of intelligence, which Somalia could not have provided on its own at all considering its limited resources, what Al-Shabaab was doing to regain territory was not considered. An important consideration about Somalia is its label as a failed state, primarily because it has little to no control over its own population. This means that the terrorist group now has control over it. The questions of what Al-Shabaab strategically did to keep Somali citizens under their territory and how they maintained it could have been important for Somalia’s long term success against the terrorist group.